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INTRODUCTION 
“Counsel’s argument that the parties voluntarily agreed to arbitration and 
that the process saves money is also disingenuous. . . . [I]ndividuals have 
no recourse but to agree to an arbitration clause.  Further, since the 
individuals seldom win and are forced to reimburse costs and attorney fees, 
the only ones saving money are large institutions like the claimant.”1 
 
The pervasive use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
(“PDAAs”) in the securities industry is a relatively new phenomenon.  
Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court announced that federal 
statutory rights, specifically claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 
(“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange 
Act”), are subject to arbitration unless Congress has evinced a contrary 
intent.2  An overwhelming majority of retail brokerage and many 
investment advisory agreements include language requiring all disputes 
between the customer and broker-dealer/investment adviser be resolved 
through arbitration3—most often with Financial Industry Regulatory 
 
 1.  Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Watts, 858 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (W.D.N.C. 2012). 
 2.  See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that 
claims under a certain provision of the Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable under pre-
dispute arbitration agreements, and that agreements to arbitrate these claims are enforceable 
because customers could effectively vindicate their claims against broker in arbitral forum). 
 3.  Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (“SEC”), Speech before the 
North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) Annual NASAA/SEC 
19(d) Conference:  Outmanned and Outgunned:  Fighting on Behalf of Investors Despite 
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Authority (“FINRA”) Dispute Resolution.  Thus, only in rare instances can 
an investor open a brokerage or investment advisory account without 
agreeing to submit to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. 
This Article begins by discussing the jurisprudence of mandatory 
PDAAs in the securities industry, including the legality of forcing investors 
to waive access to class action lawsuits.  The Article then transitions into a 
discussion of the arguments against the use of mandatory PDAAs, 
including the Supreme Court invention of a “pro-arbitration” policy and the 
adhesive nature of brokerage and advisory contracts.  The Article then 
argues that mandatory PDAAs are per se unconscionable because they 
require investors to involuntarily waive certain constitutional rights and 
provide narrow appellate avenues that effectively preclude judicial review 
of arbitral awards.  The Article concludes by providing an example of a 
mandatory PDAA reflecting the current legal regime governing arbitration 
and possible solutions for policy-makers—the most appropriate of which is 
to prohibit the use of mandatory PDAAs in the securities industry. 
This topic is timely, especially since FINRA recently enforced a 
$500,000 fine on Charles Schwab & Co. for using a mandatory PDAA in 
contravention of FINRA rules.  There has also been heightened 
Congressional interest in the issue, evidenced by a bill proposed by 
Representative Keith Ellison in the House of Representatives in 20134 and 
a recent Senate Financial Committee report citing mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements as a critical issue for the SEC to investigate.5 
The use of mandatory arbitration agreements has harmed thousands of 
investors over the past twenty years.  A June 2007 study of more than 
14,000 FINRA arbitration awards over a ten-year period (1995—2004) 
found that investors with significant claims suing major brokerage firms 
could expect to recover only twelve percent of the amount claimed.6  In a 
 
Efforts to Weaken Investor Protections (Apr. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515400#.UfmMlZWdzdk 
(“Currently, almost all customer agreements with brokerage firms include an arbitration 
clause requiring customers to arbitrate their claims in an arbitration forum—and they’re now 
popping-up in the investment advisory industry.”). 
 4.  Investor Choice Act of 2013, H.R. 2998, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 5.  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 113TH CONG., FY 2015 FINANCIAL 
SERVICES AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATIONS BILL (Comm. Print 2014), available 
at http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/sites/default/files/FSGG%20Report%20w%20 
Chart% 2003REPT.PDF. 
 6.  See EDWARD S. O’NEAL & DANIEL R. SOLIN, SEC. LITIG. & CONSULTING GRP., 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF SECURITIES DISPUTES:  A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF HOW 
CLAIMANTS FARE 15 (2007), available at http://slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/ 
Mandatory%20Arbitration%20Study.pdf (emphasis added) (finding a recovery percentage 
of just 12 percent when the claimant sought over $250,000 against one of the top twenty 
brokerage firms). 
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2008 survey of over 3,000 individuals who participated in an arbitration 
(e.g., investors, advisors, attorneys), seventy-one percent of investors were 
dissatisfied with the outcome of the arbitration.7  Even with these chilling 
figures, it is important to note that arbitration is a proper dispute resolution 
process for some investors; however, individual investors should be 
permitted to make that choice. 
I. JURISPRUDENCE OF MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
Even though the pervasive use of mandatory PDAAs has only arisen 
in the last thirty years, the issue of the legality of mandatory PDAAs 
stretches back to the 1950s.  This Section will demonstrate the Supreme 
Court’s evolution on the issue of mandatory PDAAs, illustrate the current 
view of the Supreme Court on how these agreements are enforced, and 
analyze recent developments concerning the use of class action waivers in 
mandatory PDAAs. 
A. Enforceability in Brokerage and Advisory Contracts 
1. Wilko v. Swan 
In the Supreme Court’s 1953 decision, Wilko v. Swan,8 a customer 
brought an action against a securities brokerage firm to recover damages 
under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 19339 for alleged 
misrepresentation in the sale of securities.  The brokerage contract between 
 
 7.  Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality:  An Empirical 
Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 
386 (2008). 
 8.  346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
 9.  See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 
2011) (“Any person who . . . sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of 
section 77c of this title, other than paragraphs (2) and (14) of subsection (a) of said section), 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate 
commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes 
an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not 
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable . . . to the person 
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of 
competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest 
thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, 
or for damages if he no longer owns the security.”). 
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the investor and broker contained a mandatory PDAA.10  Based upon the 
language of the contract, the broker moved to stay the trial of the action 
pursuant to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)11 until an 
arbitration, in accordance with the terms of the contract, was had.12 
The district court held that “the agreement to arbitrate deprived [the 
investor] of the advantageous court remedy afforded by the Securities Act, 
and denied the stay.”13  A divided Second Circuit concluded that the 
Securities Act “did not prohibit the agreement to refer future controversies 
to arbitration, and reversed.”14  The case was subsequently taken up by the 
Supreme Court. 
Before beginning its analysis, the Supreme Court noted that because 
the contract between the investor and broker evidenced a transaction in 
interstate commerce, there was no issue as to the applicability of the 
provisions of the FAA to the lawsuit.15  The Supreme Court looked at the 
question of “whether an agreement to arbitrate a future controversy is a 
‘condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any 
security to waive compliance with any provision’ of the Securities Act 
which § 14 declares ‘void.’”16 
The Supreme Court held that Section 14 of the Securities Act voids 
any “‘stipulation’ waiving compliance with any ‘provision’ of the 
Securities Act” and that the agreement to arbitrate was “a ‘stipulation’ 
and . . . the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of ‘provision’ that 
cannot be waived under [Section] 14 of the Securities Act.”17  The Supreme 




 10.  Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429. 
 11.  See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (“If any suit or proceeding be brought in 
any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an 
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon 
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration 
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action 
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing 
the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.”). 
 12.  Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429. 
 13.  Id. at 430. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. (citing Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012 & Supp. I 2013)).  
Section 14 of the Securities Act states that “[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision 
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this 
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.”  15 U.S.C. § 
77n. 
 17.  Id. at 434–35. 
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While a buyer and seller of securities, under some circumstances, 
may deal at arm’s length on equal terms, it is clear that the 
Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under 
which buyers labor.  Issuers of and dealers in securities have 
better opportunities to investigate and appraise the prospective 
earnings and business plans affecting securities than buyers.  It is 
therefore reasonable for Congress to put buyers of securities 
covered by that Act on a different basis from other purchasers.18 
2. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 
The Supreme Court revisited this issue over two decades later in 1974 
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,19 Franz 
Scherk, a German businessman, sold his trademarks and interest in a 
European toiletries business to Alberto-Culver, Co., a U.S. corporation.20  
Approximately one year after the sale, Alberto-Culver tendered the 
property back to Scherk, because the trademarks were subject to substantial 
encumbrances that threatened to restrict Alberto-Culver’s use of them.21  
When Scherk refused to rescind the contract, Alberto-Culver sued Scherk 
in federal court in Illinois.22  Scherk subsequently filed a motion to dismiss 
based upon an arbitration clause in the contract of sale that provided that 
“‘any controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this agreement or the 
breach thereof’ would be referred to arbitration before the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France.”23 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Illinois, relying on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan, denied Scherk’s motion to 
dismiss and “granted a preliminary order enjoining Scherk from proceeding 
with arbitration.”24  The Seventh Circuit, similarly relying on Wilko v. 
Swan, affirmed the District Court’s decision.25  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to review the question of whether an arbitration agreement 
contained in an international sales contract was enforceable. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision.26  The 
Supreme Court first looked at whether the Wilko reasoning applied to the 
case at bar.  The Court looked at both the Securities Act and the Securities 
 
 18.  Id. at 435. 
 19.  417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
 20.  Id. at 508. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 510. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 513. 
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Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and found that there was no 
statutory counterpart for the Section 12(a)(2) action brought by the plaintiff 
in Wilko.27  The Court then discussed how even if there was a statutory 
counterpart in the Exchange Act, the international business contract at issue 
involved considerations and policies significantly different than those 
found controlling in Wilko.28  The Court found that “[a] contractual 
provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be 
litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable 
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential 
to any international business transaction.”29 
The Supreme Court relied on the international nature of the contract at 
issue in Scherk to enforce the arbitration agreement.  The Court was 
careful, though, to make clear that the decision “has no bearing on the 
scope of the substantive provisions of the federal securities laws [because] 
that . . . question is not presented in this case.”30 
3. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon 
The Supreme Court revisited this issue again over a decade later in 
1987 in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon. In Shearson/American 
Express v. McMahon,31 customers brought an action against a securities 
brokerage firm claiming that the firm violated Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act by making fraudulent and excessive trades on the customers’ 
accounts, making false statements, and omitting material facts from advice 
given to customers.32  The contract between the customers and brokerage 
firm contained a mandatory PDAA.  Based upon the language of the 
contract, the brokerage firm moved to stay the trial of the action pursuant to 
Section 3 of the FAA until an arbitration in accordance with the terms of 
the contract was conducted33 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York first 
found that the brokerage agreement between the customers and the firm 
were not contracts of adhesion.34  The District Court, relying on Dean 
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd35 and the “‘strong national policy favoring the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements,’” held that the customers’ Section 
 
 27.  Id. at 513. 
 28.  Id. at 515–16. 
 29.  Id. at 516. 
 30.  Id. at 518 n.12. 
 31.  482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 32.  Id. at 223. 
 33.  Id. at 223–24. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
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10(b) claims were arbitrable under the terms of the agreement.36  The 
Second Circuit, relying on Wilko v. Swan, reversed the District Court’s 
decision concerning the Exchange Act claims.37  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split regarding the arbitrability of 
Exchange Act claims. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision with 
regard to the Exchange Act claims.  The Supreme Court opened with the 
statement that the FAA established a “‘federal policy favoring arbitration’” 
and that the Court should “‘rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.’”38  
The Court focused on its previous decision in Wilko and held that “[w]hile 
stare decisis concerns may counsel against upsetting Wilko’s contrary 
conclusion under the Securities Act, we refuse to extend Wilko’s reasoning 
to the Exchange Act in light of these intervening regulatory 
developments.”39  The regulatory developments cited by the Court included 
the competence of arbitral panels to decide securities claims and the 
expansive power and authority that the SEC has over the arbitral 
proceedings.40  The Court concluded its decision with its interpretation of 
Congress’s intent:  
  
Congress did not intend for [Section] 29(a) to bar enforcement of 
all predispute arbitration agreements.  In this case, where the SEC 
has sufficient statutory authority to ensure that arbitration is 
adequate to vindicate Exchange Act rights, enforcement does not 
effect a waiver of ‘compliance with any provision’ of the 
Exchange Act under [Section] 29(a).41 
4. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 
In the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision, Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,42 investors brought an action against a 
securities brokerage firm to recover damages under Section 12(2) of the 
Securities Act43 for alleged misrepresentation in the sale of securities.44  
 
 36.  Shearson, 482 U.S. at 224. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 226 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24 (1983) and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
 39.  Id. at 234. 
    40.  17 CFR § 240.19b–4. As part of the SEC’s oversight of FINRA, FINRA must seek 
approval from the SEC to amend existing rules or implement new rules, including rules 
governing arbitration. 
 41.  Id. at 238. 
 42.  490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 43.  Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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The contract between the investor and broker contained a mandatory 
PDAA.  Based upon the language of the contract, the broker moved to stay 
the trial of the action pursuant to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
until an arbitration in accordance with the terms of the contract was had.45 
The “District Court ordered all the claims to be submitted to 
arbitration except for those raised under [Section] 12(2) of the Securities 
Act.”46  It held that the Securities Act claims must proceed in the court 
under the Supreme Court’s holding in Wilko.47  The Fifth Circuit reversed, 
concluding that the arbitration agreement is enforceable because “[the 
Supreme] Court’s subsequent decisions have reduced Wilko to 
‘obsolescence.’”48  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the 
conflict among the circuit courts regarding the arbitrability of Securities 
Act claims. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision with regard 
to the Securities Act claims.  The Court looked at McMahon, which 
“declined to read [Section] 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
the language of which is in every respect the same as that in [Section] 14 of 
the 1933 Act . . . to prohibit enforcement of predispute agreements to 
arbitrate.”49  The Court focused on its “pro-arbitration policy” by finding 
that “the party opposing arbitration carries the burden of showing that 
Congress intended in a separate statute to preclude a waiver of judicial 
remedies, or that such a waiver of judicial remedies inherently conflicts 
with the underlying purposes of that other statute.”50  And, relying on the 
dissent in Wilko, held that “‘[t]here is nothing in the record before us, nor 
in the facts of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral 
system . . . would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is 
entitled.’”51  The Court concluded by specifically holding that “Wilko was 
incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform 
construction of other federal statutes governing arbitration agreements in 
the setting of business transactions.”52 
The importance of the decisions in McMahon and Rodriguez de 
Quijas cannot be underestimated.  The decisions reversed the Supreme 
Court’s previous decision in Wilko and 32 years of lower court decisions 
relying on Wilko, which had deemed Securities Act and Exchange Act 
 
 44.  Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 478–79. 
 45.  Id. at 479. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 482. 
 50.  Id. at 483. 
 51.  Id. (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
 52.  Id. at 484. 
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claims not arbitrable.  These decisions also signify the first time the 
Supreme Court interjected its “pro-arbitration” policy into a securities law 
decision.  This policy will be discussed in further detail later in the Article. 
B. Legality of Class Action Waiver Provisions 
The Supreme Court has effectively ruled that companies may include 
class action waiver provisions in their brokerage and advisory contracts.53  
The Supreme Court’s recent allowance of class action waivers deviates 
from prior holdings that touted the merits of class action lawsuits.54  
Additionally, FINRA recently opposed the Supreme Court’s allowance of 
class action waivers and fined one of its members for using it in a 
brokerage contract. 
1. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion 
In Concepcion, customers who entered into a contract with AT&T 
brought a class action suit alleging fraud and false advertising in 
connection with the carrier’s advertising practices.55  The customer contract 
provided for “arbitration of all disputes between the parties, but required 
that claims be brought in the parties’ ‘individual capacity, and not as a 
plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative 
proceeding.’”56  AT&T moved to compel arbitration, citing the mandatory 
arbitration agreement in its customer contract that prohibited class 
actions.57  The district court denied AT&T’s motion and held that the 
mandatory arbitration provision was unconscionable because AT&T had 
failed to demonstrate that the provision “adequately substituted for the 
deterrent effects of class actions.”58  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding 
that the class action waiver provision was unconscionable and that the 
California rule was not preempted by the FAA because it was “‘a 
 
 53.  See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that 
the FAA preempted a California law that would have invalidated an arbitration clause 
containing a class action waiver). 
 54.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van 
Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class 
action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the 
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”). 
 55.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 1745. 
 58.  Id. (citing Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 (S.D. Cal. 
Aug. 11, 2008)). 
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refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts 
generally in California.’”59 
The Supreme Court, in a divided 5—4 decision, reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding, finding that the FAA preempted state law that operated 
to invalidate a contractual arbitration provision.  Specifically, the Supreme 
Court held that because the rule had been routinely applied by California 
courts to invalidate arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts, the rule 
stood as “‘an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”60 
2. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant 
In Italian Colors, the plaintiffs were merchants who accepted 
American Express charge cards and credit cards pursuant to contracts with 
American Express.61  They alleged that American Express violated the 
federal antitrust laws by forcing them to accept American Express credit 
cards at interchange rates for merchants that were approximately 30 percent 
higher than the rates for competing credit cards.62  The business contract 
contained “a clause that requires all disputes between the parties to be 
resolved by arbitration.  The agreement also provide[d] that ‘[t]here shall 
be no right or authority for any [c]laims to be arbitrated on a class action 
basis.’”63  The District Court granted the motion of American Express to 
compel individual arbitration.64  The Second Circuit reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings, holding that “because respondents had established 
that ‘they would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate under the 
class action waiver,’ the waiver was unenforceable and the arbitration 
could not proceed.”65 
The Supreme Court, in a 5—3 decision, held that a waiver of class 
arbitration was enforceable under the FAA, even if the plaintiffs’ costs of 
individually arbitrating their antitrust claims exceeded the potential 
recovery for each plaintiff.66  The Supreme Court specifically held that “the 
fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy 
does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy” and 
 
 59.  Id. (quoting Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009)).   
 60.  Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 61.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 62.  Id. at 2308. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. (quoting In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 315–16 (2d Cir. 
2009)). 
 66.  Id. at 2311. 
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that the Court’s previous decision in Concepcion “all but resolve[d] this 
case.”67 
3. FINRA v. Schwab 
In February 2012, FINRA, which is an independent, not-for-profit 
organization authorized by Congress to regulate securities firms and 
associated persons who do business with the public, brought a disciplinary 
action68 against Charles Schwab & Co., a brokerage and banking 
company.69  The first cause of action alleged that Schwab, by placing a 
class-action waiver in its customer agreements and attempting to limit 
customers’ ability to bring or participate in class actions, violated FINRA 
Rule 2268(d)(3)70 and FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer 
Disputes (“FINRA Customer Code”) Rule 12204(d).71  These regulations 
concern a firm’s ability to use a pre-dispute arbitration agreement to limit 
or contradict FINRA rules and enforce a class action waiver provision in its 
contract.    
FINRA takes disciplinary action through issuance of a formal 
complaint. When a complaint is issued, the case is heard before a Hearing 
Panel that is chaired by a professional hearing officer and includes two 
industry representatives.72  A firm or individual can appeal a Hearing Panel 
decision to FINRA's National Adjudicatory Council (NAC), a body that is 
 
 67.  Id. at 2312 (emphasis in original). 
    68.   The Complaint was filed with the FINRA Office of Hearing Officers. 
 69.  Dep’t. of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Disciplinary Proceeding No. 
2011029760201 (FINRA Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 21, 2013), at 3, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/documents/ohodecisions/p258285.pdf.). 
 70.  FINRA Rule 2268(d)(1) states that “[n]o predispute arbitration agreement shall 
include any condition that . . . limits or contradicts the rules of any self-regulatory 
organization . . . .” FINRA RULE 2268(d)(1), FINRA MANUAL: DUTIES & CONFLICTS., FIN. 
INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (as amended in 2011), available at http://finra.complinet.com/ 
en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9955&filtered_tag= 
 71.  FINRA Customer Code Rule 12204(d) states that:  
[a] member or associated person may not enforce any arbitration agreement 
against a member of a certified or putative class action with respect to any claim 
that is the subject of the certified or putative class action until:  [(1)] [t]he class 
certification is denied; [(2)] [t]he class is decertified; [(3)] [t]he member of the 
certified or putative class is excluded from the class by the court; or [(4)] [t]he 
member of the certified or putative class elects not to participate in the class or 
withdraws from the class according to conditions set by the court, if any. 
 FINRA RULE 12204(d), FINRA MANUAL: CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR 
CUSTOMER DISPUTES, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (as amended in 2008), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4096&r
ecord_id=5174&filtered_tag= 
    72.   Adjudication, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., available at http://www.finra.org/ 
Industry/Enforcement/Adjudication/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).  
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equally balanced between individuals who are in the securities business and 
non-industry representatives. FINRA's Board of Governors can decide 
whether or not to review the NAC's decision; if there is no review, the 
NAC decision is FINRA's final action in the matter. A firm or individual 
can appeal FINRA's final decision to the SEC and then to a federal court.73   
The Hearing Panel issued its decision in February 2013.74  The 
Hearing Panel’s decision concentrated primarily on two issues:  (1) 
whether Schwab’s waiver conflicts with FINRA rules, and (2), if so, 
whether the FAA preempts FINRA rules.  The Hearing Panel found that 
both FINRA Rules 2268(d)(1) and (d)(3), acting in conjunction with Rule 
12204 of the FINRA Customer Code, banned the use of class action 
waivers by FINRA members.75  However, the Hearing Panel ultimately 
concluded that these Rules may not be enforced.76  The Hearing Panel 
found that enforcement was foreclosed by the FAA, as construed by the 
Supreme Court in Concepcion and other decisions.77  Because the Hearing 
Panel found no clear expression of congressional intent to preserve judicial 
class actions as an option for customer claims where there is an agreement 
providing for arbitration of those claims, the Hearing Panel granted 
Schwab’s motion for summary disposition concerning the mandatory 
PDAA’s class-action waiver provision. 
Contemporaneously with the FINRA disciplinary action, Schwab filed 
a complaint for declaratory and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief 
against FINRA in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California.78  “Schwab argued that FINRA Rule 2268(d), properly 
interpreted, does not prohibit class action waivers and, in the alternative, 
even if intended to do so, the rule’s enforcement would impermissibly 
violate the FAA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility . . . 
and CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).”79 
 FINRA filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the 
federal court lacked jurisdiction.  On May 11, 2012, the district court 
 
    73.   Id. 
 74.  Dep’t. of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Disciplinary Proceeding No. 
2011029760201 (FINRA Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 21, 2013), at 1, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/documents/ohodecisions/p258285.pdf.  
 75.  Id. at 23–24. 
 76.  Id. at 40–41. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Charles Schwab & Co v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012). 
 79.  Dep’t of Enforcement v. Schwab, Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2011029760201 
(FINRA Board of Governors Apr. 24, 2014), at 5 n.8, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@ad/documents/industry/p493598.pdf 
[hereinafter Board of Governors Decision]; Charles Schwab & Co, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. 
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granted FINRA’s motion and dismissed Schwab’s complaint.  The court 
determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Schwab did 
not exhaust the administrative remedies established by the Exchange Act 
and that Schwab failed to show it was entitled to an exception from the 
general exhaustion requirement.80 
  This is an important procedural issue, because for any companies 
who want to challenge this type of disciplinary action, generally they must 
go through the administrative process before being able to utilize the 
judicial system.  Many companies might find the burden cost inefficient 
and may just remove these provisions from their mandatory PDAAs. 
The Board of Governors found that the two main issues regarding the 
enforceability of Schwab’s pre-dispute arbitration agreements were:  (1) 
whether FINRA rules preserve the right for investors to participate in 
judicial class actions and (2) whether the FAA applies to FINRA arbitration 
rules and preempts enforcement of those rules.81 
The Board of Governors addressed these two issues in its decision and 
ultimately overruled the Hearing Panel decision, stating that:   
 
We uphold these FINRA rules and find that Schwab’s inclusion 
of a mandatory waiver of participation in judicial class actions, as 
well as its restriction of an arbitrator’s power to join together 
individual claims violates NASD and FINRA rules.  Because we 
determine that the FAA does not preclude FINRA’s enforcement 
of its rules, we reverse the Hearing Panel’s dismissal of the first 
two causes of action.  We remand this matter to the Hearing 
Panel to determine appropriate sanctions.82 
 
In arriving at this decision, the Board of Governors first looked at the 
language of the rules in question (FINRA Rule 2268 and FINRA Customer 
Code Rule 12204).  FINRA Rule 2268 sets the requirements for FINRA 
members when using pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  Rule 2268(f) 
requires all pre-dispute arbitration agreements for customer accounts to 
state that no person may bring a class action in arbitration, nor seek to 
enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement against a person who has 
initiated a judicial class action or is a member of a putative class until class 
certification issues are decided.83  The decision also focused on Rule 
 
 80.  Board of Governors Decision, supra note 79, at 5 n.8; Charles Schwab & Co, 861 
F. Supp. 2d at 1069. 
 81.  Board of Governors Decision, supra note 79, at 3. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  FINRA RULE 2268(f), FINRA MANUAL: DUTIES & CONFLICTS, FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH. (as amended in 2011), available at http://finra.complinet.com 
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2268(d)(3) which prohibits members from incorporating conditions in a 
pre-dispute arbitration agreement that “limit[] the ability of a party to file 
any claim in court permitted to be filed in court under the rules of the 
forums in which a claim may be filed under the agreement.”84 
Schwab argued that FINRA Rule 2268(d)(3) cannot be referring to 
class actions when the rule language uses the term “claim” because class 
actions are procedural mechanisms and not claims.85  To determine the 
meaning of the word “claim”, the Board of Governors turned to the 
definition set out in FINRA Customer Code Rule 12100(d), which defines 
a “claim” as “an allegation or request for relief.”86  Rule 12204 of the 
Customer Code is titled “Class Action Claims” and specifically addresses 
the status of class action claims in FINRA arbitration, stating that “[c]lass 
action claims may not be arbitrated under the [Customer] Code.”87 
The Board of Governors then proceeded to examine the rule-making 
history.  It specifically focused on the intent behind Rule 12204 and found 
that the SEC stated “‘in all cases, class actions are better handled by the 
courts and that investors should have access to the courts to resolve class 
actions efficiently’” and “[w]ithout access to class actions in appropriate 
cases, both investors and broker-dealers have been put to the expense of 
wasteful, duplicative litigation.”88 
The Board of Governors ultimately determined that “a securities-law 
claim brought as a class action therefore is a category of claim that was 
intended to be filed in court under FINRA rules.”89 The Board of 
Governors further determined that “Rule 12204 of the Customer Code was 
intended to preserve investor access to the courts to bring or participate in 
judicial class actions, and that through its Waiver, Schwab violated FINRA 
Rules 2268(d)(l) and (d)(3), and Rule 12204 of the Customer Code.”90 
Even though the Board of Governors found that there was a breach of 
its rules, they still had to determine whether the FAA pre-empted 
enforcement of those rules.  As a threshold matter, the Board of Governors 
found that the FAA applied to the case because it governs virtually every 
 
/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9955&filtered_tag= 
 84.  FINRA RULE 2268(d)(3), FINRA MANUAL: DUTIES & CONFLICTS, FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH. (as amended in 2011), available at http://finra.complinet.com/ 
en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9955&filtered_tag= 
 85.  Board of Governors Decision, supra note 79, at 8. 
 86.  Id. at 10. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 14 (quoting Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the 
Exclusion of Class Actions from Arbitration Proceedings, Exchange Act Release No. 31371, 
1992 WL 324491, at *3). 
 89.  Id. at 10 
 90.  Id. at 15. 
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arbitration agreement arising out of a commercial transaction, and 
Schwab’s customer transactions were no exception.91  This decision first 
makes clear that even though there is a long-standing policy of favoring 
arbitration agreements, the FAA has limits.  The Board of Governors cited 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, where “the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the principle that the mandate of the FAA is not absolute, explaining that it 
may be ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’”92 
To meet the standard under Greenwood, the decision specifically 
found that “both the text of the Exchange Act and the rulemaking history of 
NASD’s proposal to adopt what are currently FINRA Rule 2268 and Rule 
12204 of the Customer Code demonstrate a statutorily authorized intent to 
overcome the FAA.”93 
The Board of Governors looked at the Hearing Panel’s determination 
that found no congressional intent to preserve judicial class actions as an 
option for customer claims under FINRA rules.  They reversed the Hearing 
Panel and found that FINRA’s authority to promulgate rules is a 
Congressional command.94  The decision cited to CompuCredit, where the 
Supreme Court cited the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
(“CFPB”) authority to regulate predispute arbitration agreements as an 
example of a contrary congressional command.  The Supreme Court found 
that “Congress both delegated to an agency and allowed the agency to 
exercise judgment.  Consequently, we conclude that Congress’s granting of 
authority to the SEC to approve of SRO limitations on arbitration 
agreements is equally as valid as its granting of authority to the CFPB.”95 
The Board of Governors then cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald for the proposition that 
“FINRA rules have the force and effect of a federal regulation for the 
 
 91.  Id. at 16.  They specifically noted that the Supreme Court had applied the FAA to 
securities arbitrations under the Exchange Act.  Id.; see Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (indicating courts should favor enforcement of arbitration 
agreements).  
 92.  Board of Governors Decision, supra note 79, at 18 (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012)).  
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 20. 
 95.  Id. at 20.  “The Exchange Act manifestly gives FINRA the ability to propose, and 
the SEC the authority to approve, rules that govern which claims will be submitted to 
arbitration and which will not.  The rulemaking history of FINRA’s rules evidences that the 
SEC was approving FINRA’s restrictions on predispute arbitration agreements pursuant to 
the Exchange Act.  The SEC followed Congress’s designated process for a FINRA rule to 
be approved.  The Exchange Act’s broad authorization encompassing FINRA arbitration 
rules that are approved by the SEC constitutes the Supreme Court’s required congressional 
command to overcome the general mandate of the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements.”  
Id. at 21. 
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purposes of resolving federal conflicts of law.”96  In Grunwald, the Ninth 
Circuit held that NASD’s arbitration rules regarding disclosure and 
disqualification of arbitrators, which had been approved by the SEC, 
preempted conflicting state law requirements regarding arbitrators.97  The 
Board of Governors surveyed other cases where conflicts existed between 
the antitrust laws and the securities laws, including SEC and FINRA rules, 
and found that securities laws prevailed when the Court determined that the 
antitrust laws would produce conflicting guidance in an area that is 
addressed by the securities laws.98 
The Board of Governors reasoned that:  
 
 [t]he Supreme Court’s holdings that federal antitrust laws are 
impliedly repealed when they conflict with securities laws 
support the conclusion that the Exchange Act, effectuated 
through FINRA rules, overrides the FAA here.  First, the SEC, 
through its oversight of the FINRA arbitration forum and its 
review of FINRA rules, has consistently exercised its authority to 
oversee the arbitration process.  Second, the Schwab dispute 
represents a direct conflict between the FAA, which mandates 
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms, 
and FINRA rules, which require broker dealers to preserve 
judicial class actions for investors.  Third, FINRA’s arbitration 
rules for customer disputes with FINRA firms and associated 
persons address a critical aspect of investor protection under the 
Exchange Act, namely in what forum a customer class action will 
be litigated.  In reconciling the conflict between FINRA 
arbitration rules that prohibit use of a predispute arbitration 
agreement to eliminate judicial class actions and the FAA’s 
enforcement of class action waivers, we find—based on the 
SEC’s approval orders—that FINRA’s rules are in furtherance of 
the Exchange Act’s protection of investors.  This core aspect of 
the Exchange Act prevails over the FAA.99 
 
Schwab sought to use a series of recent Supreme Court opinions 
involving pre-dispute arbitration agreements between customers and 
 
 96.  Id. at 21 (citing Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1132 
(9th Cir. 2005)). 
 97.  Id. (citing Grunwald, 400 F.3d at 1132). 
 98.  Id. (citing Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. 
NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975)). 
 99.  Id. at 22. 
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corporations to invalidate two of FINRA’s longstanding arbitration rules.100  
However, after careful consideration, the Board of Governors found that 
FINRA’s rules had not been invalidated by recent Supreme Court holdings 
related to pre-dispute arbitration agreements.101 In so doing, the Board of 
Governors first looked at Concepcion, which involved a state law rule that 
invalidated class action waivers when one party had superior bargaining 
power and was alleged to have caused small damages to many 
customers.102  FINRA held that “the line of cases in which courts have 
invalidated state laws based on federal preemption, however, do not apply 
to this case.  FINRA arbitration rules are not creatures of state law nor 
should they be treated as equivalent to state law.”103 
The Board of Governors then looked at American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant, which reaffirmed that “the FAA ‘requires the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements containing class action waivers’ 
unless a law contains a contrary congressional command.”104  FINRA 
distinguished Italian Colors because, in that case, the Supreme Court found 
that “[p]redispute arbitration waivers that have the effect of making an 
individual party bear the expense of proving a violation . . . are valid and 
enforceable.”105  However, the Board of Governors found that Italian 
Colors did not apply to Schwab because there is no contention that 
customers must be allowed to pursue judicial class actions as a matter of 
efficiency.106 
Schwab also relied on McMahon, which, as noted above, is the 
seminal case applying the FAA to securities arbitrations.  Schwab 
contended that the holding in McMahon, that arbitration agreements were 
not invalid waivers of Exchange Act claims (those claims could be pursued 
in arbitration), mandates that class action waivers are valid.107  But the 
Board of Governors found that the anti-waiver provision under the 
Exchange Act at issue in McMahon only prohibited a waiver of the 
substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange Act.  The Board of 
Governors reasoned that “Rule 12204 of the Customer Code, in contrast, 
preserves investor access to the courts to bring or participate in judicial 
class actions.  Schwab’s class action waiver directly violates FINRA rules.  
 
   100.  Id. at 23-24.  
   101.  Id. at 23. 
 102.  See supra Section II.B.1 (discussing the AT&T Mobility decision). 
 103.  Board of Governors Decision, supra note 79, at 23. 
 104.  Id. (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)). 
 105.  Id. (citing Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311). 
 106.  Id. at 23–24. 
 107.  Id. at 24. 
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It is not invalid because it requires a customer to waive a substantive 
obligation imposed by the Exchange Act.”108 
This decision has the ability to be a game-changer in the mandatory 
arbitration discussion.  FINRA is asserting its authority to invalidate class 
action waivers in the mandatory PDAAs of its members.  The fact that 
Schwab paid a $500,000 fine and waived its right to appeal the decision is 
very telling.109  This large fine may deter other companies from placing 
class action waivers in their pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 
It is important to note, however, that this is a decision made by 
FINRA, not a court of law.  If a similar case rises to the courts, it will be 
much harder for plaintiffs to argue against enforcement of the class action 
waiver, due to the negative precedent set by Concepcion, Italian Colors, 
and the Supreme Court’s long-standing policy favoring arbitration.  This 
notion is reinforced by the recent decision in Torres v. United Healthcare 
Servs., Inc., where a New York District Court found that the National 
Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) interpretation of the FAA was outside 
its expertise and not entitled to deference.110  Courts have also found that 
they are “not obligated to defer to an agency’s interpretation of Supreme 
Court precedent under Chevron or any other principle.”111 
It is also important to note that this action was mainly brought about 
by customer complaints.  Schwab admitted in news articles that: 
 
 [o]ver the last year, we heard clearly that a number of our clients 
and members of the general public have strong feelings about 
maintaining access to class-action lawsuits.  In a business like 
ours where our reputation and public trust are key to our success, 
we take perspectives like those very seriously.112 
 
This Article contends that the reputational risk faced by companies 
will be more important than any judicial decision.  This case helped 
confirm that principle.  For example, even though both the FINRA Hearing 
Panel and courts allowed the class action waiver to be included in the pre-
dispute arbitration agreement, investor complaints and bad publicity 
 
 108.  Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987)). 
 109.  See id. at 28. (detailing the sanctions imposed by FINRA’s Board of Governors on 
Schwab). 
 110.  Torres v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 368, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
 111.  N.Y. N.Y., LLC v. N.L.R.B., 313 F.3d 585, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 112.  Jed Horowitz & Suzanne Barlyn, Schwab Drops Ban on Clients Filing Class-
Action Lawsuits, REUTERS, (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/24/ 
schwab-classaction-settlement-idUSL2N0NG1XJ20140424.  
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ultimately caused Schwab to remove the provision, even if for a short 
period of time. 
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
This Article presents multiple arguments against the imposition of 
mandatory PDAAs in brokerage and advisory contracts including: (1) the 
Supreme Court’s invention of a “pro-arbitration” policy; (2) involuntary 
relinquishment of certain Constitutional rights due to mandatory PDAAs; 
and (3) the lack of options available to investors to overturn an erroneous 
arbitration award effectively preclude judicial review. 
A. Supreme Court Invention of a “Pro-Arbitration” Policy 
As discussed in the cases in Section I, over the past thirty years the 
Supreme Court has developed the idea of a “pro-arbitration” policy.113  
Over the past three decades, the practice of using arbitration in lieu of 
litigation has not only garnered approval from the Supreme Court, but has 
been encouraged by the Court.114  It is important to note the distinction 
between voluntary and mandatory arbitration.  “While arbitration has been 
used as a dispute resolution technique for thousands of years, in the past it 
has been agreed to knowingly and voluntarily, typically by two or more 
businesses.  The involuntary imposition of arbitration in lieu of open court 
procedures is a new and most controversial phenomenon.”115 
In its 1982 decision in Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court stated that 
the FAA was a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or 
procedural policies to the contrary.”116  This was the first instance in which 
the Supreme Court enunciated a federal policy that favors arbitration of 
commercial disputes.  This statement by the Court, and subsequent 
holdings in McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas, have provided businesses 
the opportunity to compel arbitration in contexts where they previously 
thought arbitration agreements would not be enforced. 
 
 113.  See supra Section I (illustrating judicial opinions in support of a pro-arbitration 
paradigm). 
   114.  See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1982) (noting that the FAA established a “federal policy favoring arbitration” and that the 
courts should “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”).  
 115.  Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1631–32 (2005) (citations omitted).   
 116.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982). 
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This Article contends that the FAA that Congress adopted over eighty 
years ago bears little resemblance to the Supreme Court’s current 
interpretation of the FAA.  The legislative history of the FAA indicates that 
the intention behind the law was to allow courts to enforce arbitration 
agreements between merchants.117  Interestingly, members of Congress 
voiced concerns that the FAA would be used against unsuspecting 
investors.  For example, Montana Senator Thomas Walsh, during a Joint 
Committee hearing, voiced his concern that: 
 
 a great many of these contracts that are entered into are really not 
voluntary things at all . . . . A man says, ‘These are our terms.  All 
right, take it or leave it.’  Well, there is nothing for the man to do 
except to sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case 
tried by the court, and has to have it tried before a tribunal in 
which he has no confidence at all.”118   
 
The Supreme Court seemed to overlook the legislative history that 
cautioned against enforcement of mandatory PDAAs on parties with 
unequal bargaining power. 
The FAA’s primary purpose was to ensure enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, not to encourage businesses to place mandatory PDAAs in 
their contracts with investors.119  The legislative history and case law reflect 
that “arbitration is a matter of contract” and that the FAA puts arbitration 
agreements “on equal footing with other contracts”120 and “creates no new 
legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement 
in commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts.”121 
It is also important to note that though the Supreme Court speaks of a 
pro-arbitration policy in all of the cited cases,122 the Court never states that 
Congress intended a pro-mandatory arbitration policy.  Based upon the 
 
 117.  See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes:  Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 
646 Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16 (1924) (statement of 
Julius Cohen, Gen. Counsel, N.Y. State Chamber of Commerce) (discussing the 
applicability of such agreements to federal court decisions that bind domestic and 
international trade agreements). 
 118.  Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal 
Commercial Arbitration:  Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcomm. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9 (1923) (statement of Sen. Thomas Walsh). 
 119.  Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1985) (concluding that 
the FAA was designed “to overrule the judiciary’s long-standing refusal to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate”). 
 120.  Janiga v. Questar Capital Corp., 615 F.3d 735, 740, 742 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 121.  65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (statement of Rep. George S. Graham) (regarding the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements). 
   122.    See supra Section I.A. 
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case law and the legislative history of the FAA, this is an important 
distinction.  The Supreme Court has consistently held that arbitration is a 
matter of consent.  In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 
the Supreme Court held that under the FAA, arbitration “is a matter of 
consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their 
arbitration agreements as they see fit.”123  In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Supreme Court reaffirmed this idea 
by stating clearly that “[t]he Court ties the requirement of affirmative 
authorization to ‘the basic precept that arbitration is a matter of consent, not 
coercion.’”124  As noted in the next Section, brokerage and advisory 
contracts are offered on a “take it or leave it” basis and do not require the 
type of consent required by the Supreme Court. 
B. Brokerage and Advisory Contracts are Contracts of Adhesion 
A contract of adhesion is defined as a “standard-form contract 
prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position . . 
. who adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms.”125  “An 
adhesion contract is typically a standardized form ‘offered to consumers of 
goods and services on essentially a ‘take it or leave it’ basis without 
affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain and under such 
conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or services 
except by acquiescing in the form contract.’”126  Courts look at multiple 
factors to determine whether a contract is one of adhesion, including 
whether there was great disparity in bargaining power, no opportunity for 
negotiation, or services that could not be obtained elsewhere.127 
Courts have found that brokerage and advisory contracts are generally 
contracts of adhesion.128  “Adhesion contracts generally warrant heightened 
judicial scrutiny because the drafting party is in a superior bargaining 
 
 123.  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). 
 124.  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 697–98 (2010) 
(quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479). 
 125. Definition of Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), 
available at Westlaw BLACKS. 
 126.  Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phx., Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1992) (quoting 
Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 356 (1976)); see Siegelman v. Cunard 
White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 204 (2d Cir. 1955) (noting that with one-sided control of a 
contract’s terms “the usual contract rules, based on the idea of ‘freedom of contract,’ cannot 
be applied rationally”). 
 127.  Brenner v. Nat’l Outdoor Leadership Sch., 20 F. Supp. 3d 709, 717 (D. Minn. 
2014). 
 128.  See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987) 
(“arbitration clauses in securities sales agreements generally are not freely negotiated”). 
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position,”129 and although they will not be found unconscionable in every 
case, “an adhesion contract is procedurally unconscionable and 
unenforceable ‘when the terms are patently unfair to the weaker party.’”130  
The Supreme Court, however, has stated that “[m]ere inequality in 
bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration 
agreements are never enforceable.”131  Enforceability also “depends upon 
whether the terms of the contract are beyond the reasonable expectations of 
an ordinary person . . . .”132 
The preceding Sections reflect the contradictory nature of the Supreme 
Court’s evolution on mandatory PDAAs.  The Court has gone to great 
lengths to show that arbitration is a matter of consent, but then 
subsequently allows mandatory PDAAs in adhesion contracts where the 
investor may not even be aware of the clause binding them to future 
arbitration.  Generally, an individual cannot consent to a contract provision 
that he or she is not aware of133 or, in the alternative, to which he or she has 
not agreed.134  The Supreme Court has also stated that “the FAA’s pro-
arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the 
contracting parties,”135 which reflects an implicit understanding that the 
FAA’s presumption in favor of arbitration should only apply when both 
parties explicitly and voluntarily state their intention to enter into 
arbitration. 
C. Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements Are Per Se 
Unconscionable 
Due to the pervasive use of adhesion contracts in the securities 
industry, investors are effectively forced to sign an agreement that binds 
 
 129.  Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803, 817 (N.M. 2011). 
 130.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 131.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). 
 132.  Howell v. NHC Healthcare–Fort Sanders, Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
 133.  O’Connor v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 441 Fed. App’x. 362, 366 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting In re Brown, 287 B.R. 676, 682 (E.D. Mich. 2001)) (“It is axiomatic that a party 
cannot consent to terms of which it is unaware.”). 
 134.  The Third Circuit’s general rule is that a party need not arbitrate unless it has 
agreed to such arbitration.  Fencourt Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 2008 WL 
2502139, at *11 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 
435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Arbitration is strictly a matter of contract.  If a party has not 
agreed to arbitrate, the courts have no authority to mandate that he do so.”); cf. Adam v. 
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d 696, 701 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that a 
broker’s failure to verbally disclose arbitration provisions did not render the provisions 
unenforceable because “the law presumes that one has read that which he has signed.”). 
 135.  Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995). 
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them to all the terms contained therein, including mandatory PDAAs.136  
Mandatory PDAAs are not within investors’ reasonable expectations and 
should be deemed per se unconscionable because they require investors’ 
involuntary waiver of certain constitutional rights and provide narrow 
appellate avenues that effectively preclude judicial review of arbitral 
awards. 
1. Involuntary Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
This Article contends that by forcing unwitting investors into 
arbitration before a dispute arises, they are being forced to relinquish 
certain constitutional rights.  As noted throughout this Article, arbitration is 
a perfectly legal and efficient method to resolve disputes; however, 
investors should not be deprived of that choice.  Individuals may 
prospectively waive their constitutional rights to access the court system 
and due process of law; this principle is not at issue.  The issue that arises 
with mandatory PDAAs is the manner in which those rights are 
relinquished by the investor. 
The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n suits at common law, 
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial 
by jury shall be preserved . . . .”137  This provision governs proceedings in 
federal court and not state court, but each state has a provision in its 
constitution that is analogous.138  An individual may waive his or her 
constitutional right to a jury trial as long as that waiver is “knowing and 
voluntary.”  Under the knowing and voluntary standard, “for a waiver to be 
effective it must be clearly established that there was ‘an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’”139  Courts 
will generally look to:  
 
(1) the conspicuousness of the [waiver] provision in the contract; 
(2) the level of sophistication and experience of the parties 
entering into the contract; (3) the opportunity to negotiate terms 
 
   136.   N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N (“NASAA”), MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION: IS IT 
FAIR AND VOLUNTARY? (2009), available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/07/NASAA-Arbitration-Statement-9.15.09.pdf (“Today, almost every broker-dealer 
includes in their customer agreements, a predispute arbitration provision that forces public 
investors to submit all disputes that they may have with the firm and/or its associated 
persons to mandatory arbitration.”).  
 137.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 138.  See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. I, § XI (“the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate.”). 
 139.  Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
464 (1938)).   
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of the contract; (4) the relative bargaining power of each party; 
and (5) whether the waiving party was represented by counsel.140 
 
The Supreme Court has traditionally been wary of waivers of 
constitutional rights in contracts of adhesion.  In Fuentes v. Shevin, the 
Supreme Court found that there was “no showing whatever that the 
appellants were actually aware or made aware of the significance of the 
fine print now relied upon as a waiver of constitutional rights” and that “a 
waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be 
clear.”141  Similarly, in Teamsters v. Terry, the Supreme Court held that 
“‘[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance 
and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any 
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with 
the utmost care.’”142 
Even with the Supreme Court’s wariness on the issue of waivers of 
constitutional rights in contracts of adhesion, courts have held that an 
individual’s waiver of his or her constitutional right to a jury trial under a 
mandatory PDAA does not have to meet the traditional “knowing and 
voluntary” standard for waiver.  In Caley v. Gulfstream, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that “general contract principles govern the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements and that no heightened ‘knowing and voluntary’ 
standard applies, even where the covered claims include federal statutory 
claims generally involving a jury trial right.”143  Courts have also found that 
when a party enters into a valid agreement to arbitrate, the party is not 
entitled to a jury trial or to a judicial forum for covered disputes.  In 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., the Supreme Court held that “[b]y agreeing to 
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, 
rather than a judicial, forum.”144  Likewise in American Heritage Life Ins. 
Co., the Fifth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment does not “‘confer 
the right to a trial, but only the right to have a jury hear the case once it is 
 
 140.  Allyn v. W. United Life Assurance Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1252 (M.D. Fla. 
2004) (citations omitted). 
 141.  Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (emphasis in original). 
 142.  Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 
(1990) (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)). 
 143.  Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1372 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 711 (5th Cir. 2002)) (“holding that parties’ 
arbitration agreement, which stated that the right to a trial and to a jury were waived, validly 
waived those trial rights, and rejecting arguments that a heightened ‘clear and unmistakable’ 
or ‘voluntary, knowing, and intelligent’ standard applied to the waiver”). 
 144.  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985). 
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determined that the litigation should proceed before a court.  If the claims 
are properly before an arbitral forum pursuant to an arbitration agreement, 
the jury trial right vanishes.’”145 
Interestingly, even with the historical importance of jury trials, 
arbitrators have been placed in a higher regard and are given more 
discretion than jurors.  The Supreme Court has been clear on this issue by 
stating that the trial judge in the federal system “‘has . . . discretion to grant 
a new trial if the verdict appears . . . to be against the weight of the 
evidence.’”146  However, concerning arbitration, the Supreme Court has 
stated that because arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial instruction 
on the law, “they need not give their reasons for their results; the record of 
their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial 
review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial.”147   
 The language in the preceding sentence is startling––an unreasoned 
decision made by individuals with neither instruction on nor mandate to 
follow any applicable law is given less judicial review than a decision 
made by a group of individuals who are given instruction on the law and 
are mandated to follow and apply that law to the facts of a case. 
Mandatory PDAAs also force investors to give up their constitutional 
right to due process of law.  In Davis v. Prudential, a customer arbitration 
case, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the state action element of a due 
process claim is absent in private arbitration cases.”148  The Seventh Circuit 
similarly held in Elmore v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway Co. that 
“the fact that a private arbitrator denies the procedural safeguards that are 
encompassed by the term ‘due process of law’ cannot give rise to a 
constitutional complaint.”149  It is important to note, that FINRA is a private 
entity.  For the purposes of National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) (now FINRA) arbitrations, courts have found that actions in the 
arbitration process are not state action because they arise from a private 
agreement.150  FINRA may engage in quasi-judicial functions, but that does 
not mean it is a state actor.151 
 
 145.  Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 294 F.3d at 711 (quoting Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1471 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). 
 146.  Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433 (1996) (quoting Byrd v. 
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958)). 
 147.  Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956). 
 148.  Davis v. Prudential Securities, Inc. 59 F.3d 1186, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 1995); see 
Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (ruling that 
conduct of exchange arbitration panel was not state action), aff’d, 898 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 
1990). 
 149.  Elmore v. Chi. & Ill. Midland Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 150.  See Bahr v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 763 F. Supp. 584, 589 (S.D. Fla. 1991) 
(concluding that the conduct at issue was only of a private corporation, not a state actor). 
 151.  See Board of Governors Decision, supra note 79, at 17 n.18 (citing Desiderio v. 
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It is instructive to look at an example of a mandatory PDAA in a 
brokerage contract under the construct above.  For this Article, the 
mandatory PDAA at issue in the FINRA v. Schwab enforcement action will 
be used.152  First, the mandatory PDAA is not in the actual contract; it is 
provided as an additional disclosure document that does not need to be 
signed by the investor.  The only mention of the mandatory PDAA is on 
Page 6 (out of 6) of the brokerage contract which states that “[b]y signing 
this Application, you acknowledge that you have received and read a copy 
of the attached Application Agreement, which contains a predispute 
arbitration provision” and “[t]he Agreement with Schwab includes a 
predispute arbitration clause.  You acknowledge receipt of the predispute 
arbitration clause . . . .”153  This language is interesting because it only 
speaks of a pre-dispute arbitration clause, but nothing about the mandatory 
nature of such clause. 
Based upon the discussion above, investors can be forced to relinquish 
rights granted to them under the U.S. Constitution and forced to enter a 
dispute resolution system that is less transparent, with no guarantee of due 
process of law, and, as discussed below, it is infinitely more difficult to get 
judicial review of an erroneous decision. 
2. Narrow Appellate Avenues Effectively Preclude Judicial Review 
of Arbitral Awards 
For the past two decades, arbitration in forums sponsored by the 
securities industry has been the primary mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes among investors, brokerage firms, and brokers.  FINRA currently 
operates as the largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry 
and has created rules by which its arbitrators must operate.154  It is 
 
Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealders, 191 F.3d 198, 206–07 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming trial court’s 
dismissal of plaintiff’s constitutional claims challenging the arbitration clause in the Form 
U4 because NASD is not a state actor nor can its actions be fairly attributable to the state)); 
see also Austern, 716 F. Supp. at 125 (holding that the conduct of an arbitration panel “did 
not in any way constitute state action”); FDIC v. Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n.9 
(9th Cir. 1987) (“The arbitration involved here was private, not state, action; it was 
conducted pursuant to contract by a private arbitrator.  Although Congress, in the exercise of 
its commerce power, has provided for some governmental regulation of private arbitration 
agreements, we do not find in private arbitration proceedings the state action requisite for a 
constitutional due process claim.”). 
 152.  Accounts, CHARLES SCHWAB, http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/investing/ 
accounts_products/accounts (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) (providing a link to the Brokerage 
Account Application Agreement). 
 153.  Id. at 6. 
 154.  See FINRA RULE 12000, FINRA MANUAL: CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR 
CUSTOMER DISPUTES, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (as amended in 2008), available at 
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important to note that this forum is separate from FINRA’s disciplinary 
function discussed earlier in the Article.  These rules cover filing and 
responding to a claim, hearings and discovery, and appointment and 
authority of the arbitrator(s).155  FINRA’s rules do not provide a process 
through which a party may challenge an arbitration award.  Thus, to 
challenge an award a party must file an action in federal court to vacate the 
decision under the very limited circumstances prescribed in the FAA:  
 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty 
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient 
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which 
the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed 
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made.156 
 
Parties who seek to challenge a final arbitration award have very few 
options.  As noted above, there are limited avenues to vacate a valid 
arbitration award.  To determine the scope of these options, it is useful to 
analyze the case law.  Because the appellate rights originate under the FAA 
and not FINRA rules, the cases discussed below include non-securities 
arbitrations. 
a. Burden of Proof Upon Aggrieved Party and Courts 
Extremely Deferential to Arbitrators 
As a starting point, a court’s limited ability to review an arbitration 
award has been described as “‘among the narrowest known to the law.’”157  
There is a presumption that arbitration awards will be confirmed.158 
 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html? rbid=2403&element_id=4096 
(detailing the rules by which the FINRA arbitrators are bound). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012 & Supp. I 2013). 
 157.  See, e.g., Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Union Pac. R.R., 119 F.3d 847, 849 
(10th Cir. 1997) (quoting ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 
1995) (holding a court could not review an arbitration award despite having jurisdiction 
over the matter). 
 158.  See Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that a court has no basis to overturn an arbitrator’s decision outside of statutory 
grounds). 
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The party moving to vacate bears the burden of refuting every rational 
basis on which the arbitrator could have relied.159  In Collins v. Chicago 
Investment Group, LLC, the plaintiff was appealing an adverse 
determination by a FINRA arbitration panel.160  The U.S. District Court for 
the District of Nevada found that “[t]he burden of establishing grounds for 
vacating an arbitration award is on the party seeking vacatur”161 and that 
“[r]eview of the award is ‘both limited and highly deferential.’”162  In 
Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P. v. Official Unsecured 
Creditors’ Committee of Bayou Group, LLC, the Second Circuit reinforced 
that the review of an arbitration award “is ‘highly deferential’ to the 
arbitrators, and relief on such a claim is therefore ‘rare.’”163 
The Second Circuit held in Wallace v. Buttar that the party moving to 
vacate an arbitration award bears the “heavy burden of showing that the 
award falls within a very narrow set of circumstances delineated by statute 
and case law.”164  In Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mutual Marine Office, 
Inc., the same court stated it has:  
 
‘consistently accorded the narrowest of readings’ to the FAA’s 
authorization to vacate awards . . . [and the Court’s] inquiry 
‘focuses on whether the arbitrators had the power based on the 
parties’ submissions or the arbitration agreement, to reach a 




 159.  First Pres. Capital, Inc. v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 
1559, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1996). 
 160.  Collins v. Chi. Inv. Group, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37217 (D. Nev. 2012). 
 161.  Id. at *1 (citing U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat’l Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 1173 
(9th Cir. 2010)). 
 162.  Id. at *2 (quoting Poweragent Inc. v. Elec. Data. Sys. Corp., 358 F.3d 1187, 1193 
(9th Cir. 2004)). 
 163.  Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ 
Comm. of Bayou Grp., LLC, 491 Fed. App’x. 201, 203 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 
2011)). 
 164.  Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Duferco Int’l Steel 
Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 165.  Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255, 262 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (quoting Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 220 (2d Cir. 
2002)); see Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 67 (2010) (stating 
that a party seeking vacatur of an arbitrator’s decision “must clear a high hurdle”). 
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The Court’s review is to “determine only whether the arbitrator did his 
job—not whether he did it well, correctly, or reasonably, but simply 
whether he did it.”166 
The courts’ opinions concerning deference to arbitrators are in direct 
conflict with the opinions concerning deference to a governmental agency.  
For example, as noted above, courts are not obligated to defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.167  By contrast, 
arbitrators do not have to follow Supreme Court precedent, but, in the event 
they do, a court’s review of an arbitration award is ‘highly deferential’ to 
the arbitrators.  This contradiction reflects a decision to arbitrarily grant 
deference to a group of individuals who generally have less legal training 
and would ultimately be more likely to misinterpret Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. 
b. Lack of Rationale Does Not Invalidate Award 
FINRA rules do not require an arbitrator to provide a reasoned opinion 
for his or her decision.168  In Goldman Sachs, the Court held that “an 
arbitral award must ‘be enforced, despite a court’s disagreement with it on 
the merits, if there is a barely colorable justification for the outcome 
reached.’”169  Similarly, in STMicroelectronics, the Court held that even 
where an arbitration panel does “not explain the reason for [its] decision, 
we will uphold it if we can discern any valid ground for it.”170 
The Ninth Circuit held in Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade 
Services, Inc. that “[n]either erroneous legal conclusions nor 
unsubstantiated factual findings justify federal court review of an arbitral 
award under the [FAA], which is unambiguous in that regard.”171  Then, in 
D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, the Second Circuit held that the 
“arbitrator’s rationale for an award need not be explained, and the award 
should be confirmed ‘if a ground for the arbitrator’s decision can be 
inferred from the facts of the case.’  Only ‘a barely colorable justification 
 
 166.  Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 76 F.3d 606, 
608 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 167.  N.Y. N.Y., LLC v. N.L.R.B., 313 F.3d 585, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
   168.   Decisions and Awards, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,  available at 
http://www.finra.org/arbitrationandmediation/arbitration/process/decisionawards/ (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2015).  
 169.  Goldman, 491 Fed. App’x. at 204 (emphasis in original) (quoting Wallace, 378 
F.3d at 190). 
 170.  STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 78 (2d 
Cir. 2011). 
 171.  Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
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for the outcome reached’ by the arbitrators is necessary to confirm the 
award.”172 
Using an example from the securities industry, in Raiford v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that an 
arbitration award for brokerage churning damages was not shown to be 
arbitrary and capricious where the arbitrator gave no explanation at all for 
his decision.173  Even though in this case the decision favored the investor, 
the next case could just as easily favor the broker. 
c. Impartiality, Bias of Arbitrators, and Presentation of 
Evidence 
Under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2), a party may vacate an arbitration award 
where there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators.  Courts 
have routinely held that this is a high burden to meet.  For example, in 
Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Co., the Second Circuit held that even where an arbitrator fails to abide by 
arbitral or ethical rules concerning disclosure of possible conflicts, such 
failure does not, in itself, entitle the losing party to vacatur of the 
arbitration award.174  Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has noted that “[t]he alleged 
partiality must be direct, definite, and capable of demonstration.”175 
Plaintiffs also have a very high burden for proving bias on the part of 
the arbitrators.  For example, in Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. 
v. YLL Irrevocable Trust, an overheard conversation in which an arbitrator 
allegedly said that one party would receive a favorable decision was not 
direct or definite evidence of bias.176 
Courts have also held that arbitrators can proceed with a decision 
without necessarily having to procure all relevant evidence.  In United 
Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., the Supreme 
Court concluded that even assuming “that the arbitrator erred in refusing to 
consider the disputed evidence, his error was not in bad faith or so gross as 
 
 172.  D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 110 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1991); Landy 
Michaels Realty Corp. v. Local 32B–32J, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 954 F.2d 794, 797 (2d 
Cir. 1992)).   
 173.  Raiford v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
 174.  Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 
74 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 175.  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 308, 329 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
 176.  Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Trust, 729 F.3d 99, 
106 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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to amount to affirmative misconduct.”177  Additionally, in National 
Casualty Co. v. First State Insurance Group, the First Circuit held that 
there was no misconduct when the arbitration panel issued the award 
without forcing the defendant company to produce relevant documents, 
because the arbitration panel acted within its authority when it chose to 
render a decision after drawing inferences against the company as to what 
documents would show.178  In short, the arbitrators were allowed to divine 
what the documents would show without the necessity of reviewing them. 
d. “Manifest Disregard of the Law” 
Barring outright fraud, deceit, or impartiality of the arbitrators, claims 
to vacate an arbitration award must be brought under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), 
which states that an award may be vacated “where the arbitrators exceeded 
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”179  As 
noted above, the aggrieved party has a high burden to show that the 
arbitrator exceeded his or her power.  In order to overturn an arbitral 
decision for excess use of power on the part of the arbitrators, the terms of 
the award must be “completely irrational.”180  To be “completely 
irrational,” the arbitrators’ decision must “‘escape[] the bounds of 
rationality’” and be entirely unsupported by the record.181 
Multiple circuits have also found two additional grounds upon which 
an award may be vacated:  namely, where the arbitrator’s award is in 
“manifest disregard” of the law182 or the terms of the relevant agreement 
between the parties are outside the reasonable expectations of the weaker 
party.183  Courts have found that “‘[m]anifest disregard of the law’ means 
 
 177.  United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 (1987). 
 178.  Nat’l Cas. Co. v. First State Ins. Group, 430 F.3d 492, 497 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 179.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012 & Supp. I 2013). 
 180.  Sherrock Bros., Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., 260 F. App’x 497, 501 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
 181.  Franko v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48907, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 
2009) (quoting Southco, Inc. v. Reell Precision Mfg. Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511 (E.D. 
Pa. 2008)). 
 182.  This Article contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Assocs., 
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. does not preclude “manifest disregard” of the law as a ground to 
vacate an arbitration award.  Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assoc., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, Improv W. Assoc. v. Comedy Club, Inc., 558 U.S. 824 (2009) 
(concluding that “after Hall Street Associates, manifest disregard of the law remains a valid 
ground for vacatur” because it is “shorthand for a statutory ground under the FAA, 
specifically 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)”). 
 183.  See, e.g., Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 665 F.3d 444, 451–52 (2d Cir. 
2011) (holding that a court may set aside an arbitration award if it was rendered in manifest 
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something more than just an error in the law or a failure on the part of the 
arbitrators to understand or apply the law.”184  In Misco, the Supreme Court 
held that “as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying 
the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is 
convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his 
decision.”185  It is not enough to say that the arbitrator erred in resolving 
conflicting precedent in favor of the defendant.186  “It must be clear from 
the record that the arbitrators recognized the applicable law and then 
ignored it.”187  For a plaintiff to succeed, he or she is required to show that 
“the arbitrators were aware of the law, understood it correctly, found it 
applicable to the case before them, and yet chose to ignore it in 
propounding their decision.”188 
To provide an example of how narrowly courts view the “manifest 
disregard” of the law, in Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., the 
prevailing party of the arbitration contended that the arbitrator could ignore 
the law if doing so would provide a fair result.189  The Eleventh Circuit 
vacated the award because: 
 
the party who obtained the favorable award had conceded to the 
arbitration panel that its position was not supported by the law, 
which required a different result, and had urged the panel not to 
follow the law . . . [and] that blatant appeal to disregard the law 
was explicitly noted in the arbitration panel’s award.190  
 
 It is important to note that the Montes case “remains the sole instance in 
which the 11th Circuit has ‘ever found the exceptional circumstances that 
 
disregard of the law). 
 184.  See, e.g., Fin. Network Inv. Corp. v. Karoon, 540 Fed. App’x. 597 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(providing a working definition of manifest disregard of the law). 
 185.  United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). 
 186.  Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306 F.3d 1214, 1217 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 187.  Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1995); see 
O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof’l Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that 
the knowing disregard of the law must be apparent on the face of the record.); see also 
Carter v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mich. Mut. 
Ins., 44 F.3d at 832) (noting that “[a]s federal courts of appeals have repeatedly held, 
‘“manifest disregard of the law” means something more than just an error in the law or a 
failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law.  It must be clear from the 
record that the arbitrators recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.’”). 
   188.    Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 149 (4th Cir. 1994). 
   189.    Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461–62 (11th Cir. 1997). 
   190.    Id. at 1464 (Carnes, J., concurring). 
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satisfy the exacting requirements’ justifying the vacation of an award due 
to manifest disregard for the law.”191 
Courts will not disturb factual findings by the arbitrator, if any are 
even made, and have consistently held that arbitration awards should not be 
vacated even if the arbitrators erred by making “contradictory findings of 
fact.”192  For example, in Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, the Supreme 
Court held that “convincing a court of an arbitrator’s error––even his grave 
error––is not enough.  So long as the arbitrator was ‘arguably construing’ 
the contract––which this one was––a court may not correct his mistakes 
under [the FAA].”193 Thus, the court noted that “‘[w]hether or not the 
panel’s findings are supported by the evidence in the record is beyond the 
scope of [the Court’s] review.’”194  The lack of rationale required under the 
FAA affects the Court’s ability to review an arbitration award––“[w]hen 
arbitrators do not state their reasons for an award, ‘it is nearly impossible 
for the court to determine whether they acted in disregard of the law.’”195 
Further confirming the oppressively narrow view taken by courts 
when reviewing arbitration awards, in Reliastar Life Insurance Co. v. EMC 
National Life Co., the Second Circuit held that “‘as long as the arbitrator is 
even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the 
scope of his authority,’ a court’s conviction that the arbitrator has 
‘committed serious error’ in resolving the disputed issue ‘does not suffice 
to overturn his decision.’”196  Indeed, courts will not vacate an award under 
 
 191.  Rueter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1262 
(D. Ala. 2006) (quoting Montes, 128 F.3d at 1461.) 
 192.  See, e.g., Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 193.  Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2070 (2013). 
 194.  Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 607 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 
2010) (quoting Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1106); see Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 195 
F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 1999) (clarifying the manifest disregard standard by noting it 
applies only to conclusions of law, not to the arbitrator’s factual findings, which are beyond 
review). 
 195.  Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dravo Corp., No. 97-149, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11648, 
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 1997) (quoting O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof’l Planning Assoc., Inc., 857 
F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
 196.  Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v. EMC Nat’l Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)).  
Where parent contended that stock in family corporation was placed in children’s names for 
purposes of estate planning and tax avoidance, and that arbitrator improperly found that 
children owned majority of stock because they gave consideration for stock, arbitrator’s 
failure to specifically discuss any legal reasoning does not establish that arbitrator identified 
applicable law and disregarded it, as required to vacate award based on manifest disregard 
of law.  Van Horn v. Van Horn, 393 F. Supp. 2d 730 (N.D. Iowa 2005); see Hutchinson v. 
Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co., 500 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Conn. 2007) (holding that arbitration 
award may not be vacated on the grounds that the arbitrator failed to interpret correctly law 
applicable to issues in dispute or misinterpreted underlying contract).  
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this standard “because of ‘a simple error in law or a failure by the 
arbitrators to understand or apply it’ but only when a party clearly 
demonstrates ‘that the panel intentionally defied the law.’”197  Courts have 
also found that they will not “vacate an arbitral award merely because [they 
are] convinced that the arbitration panel made the wrong call on the 
law.”198  Arbitrators “cannot be said to disregard a law that is unclear or not 
clearly applicable.  Thus, misapplication of an ambiguous law does not 
constitute manifest disregard.”199  Arbitrariness and capriciousness is also 
not an independent non-statutory ground for vacatur under the FAA.200 
It is important to note that even though arbitrators have virtually 
unlimited discretion regarding the facts and the law in a specific case, they 
must still generally abide by FINRA’s procedural rules of arbitration.201 In 
practice, however, because of the lack of reasoning required in the 
arbitration award and the courts’ hesitance to scrutinize arbitrations post-
award, it is likely that there will be very few successful challenges using 
this argument. 
e. Analysis 
Based upon the case law discussed above, it appears that an investor 
or financial service provider seeking to vacate an arbitration award has 
virtually no chance of being successful in the absence of outright fraud or 
an instance where the arbitrator intentionally disregards the law and then 
publishes a written decision attesting to those facts.202  It is telling that even 
adamant supporters of arbitration agree that there is virtually no effective 
way to appeal an erroneous arbitral award.  Catholic University law 
professor Peter B. Rutledge, who has authored numerous studies on the 
benefits of arbitration,203 has stated that “the grounds for vacatur are 
 
 197.  StMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 78 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (quoting Dufuerco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 
383, 389, 393 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 198.  Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 199.  Duferco, 333 F.3d at 383. 
 200.  Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 376 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 201.  See Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding 
an arbitrator’s failure to abide by procedural rules when arriving at the arbitral award may 
support a manifest disregard of the law challenge.), cf. Delta Mine Holding Co. v AFC Coal 
Props., 280 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2001) (determining that only the grounds listed under 9 
U.S.C. § 10 justify vacating an award and arbitration rules and ethical codes do not have 
force of law). 
   202.    See supra Section II.C.2. 
   203.    See, e.g., PETER B. RUTLEDGE, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
ARBITRATION—A GOOD DEAL FOR CONSUMERS:  A RESPONSE TO PUBLIC CITIZEN (2008), 
available at http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/ 
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themselves extremely narrow, and the opportunity for judicial review of the 
award’s substance virtually non-existent.”204 
To show how absurd these requirements are in practice, courts have 
found that “[n]either erroneous legal conclusions nor unsubstantiated 
factual findings justify federal court review”205 and there is no requirement 
for an arbitrator to provide a reasoned opinion for his or her decision.  
Based upon the legal precedent, an arbitrator may provide an incorrect 
legal conclusion, which is not substantiated by any factual finding, and the 
investor will still not be able to vacate the award.206 
For example, assume that the investor wanted to vacate the arbitration 
award based upon the fact that the arbitrator found that his or her broker 
was not a fiduciary.  Because the existence of a fiduciary duty is fact 
specific, the Court would not be able to review that determination.  Even if 
the court did have the power to review the factual determination, the 
arbitrator has no legal duty to provide one.  Even if the court believed that 
the arbitrator incorrectly interpreted the law by finding that the broker was 
not a fiduciary, unless the investor was able to show that the arbitrator 
knew the law and specifically ignored it, the court would not be able to 
vacate the arbitration.207 
Investors may even be sanctioned for attempting to vacate the 
arbitration award.  In Rueter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, the 
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied the investor’s 
motion to vacate and for reconsideration but granted the broker-dealer’s 
motion for sanctions.208  The Court held that a sanctions award was proper 
because the investor’s legal theory had no reasonable chance of success and 
could not be advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing law.209  
Going further, even if an investor is able to vacate an adverse arbitration 
award, the investor “must then return to arbitration to relitigate the matter 
 
200804ArbitrationGoodForConsumers-Rutledge.pdf (providing a detailed analysis of the 
benefits of arbitration). 
 204.  Peter B. Rutledge, Market Solutions to Market Problems:  Re-Examining Arbitral 
Immunity as a Solution to Unfairness in Securities Arbitration, 26 PACE L. REV. 113, 125 
(2005). 
 205.  Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
    206.   See., e.g., Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2070 (2013); Bosack 
v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009) 
 207.  Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 483 (4th Cir. 2012) (determining that 
in order to vacate an arbitration award due to manifest disregard of the relevant law, the 
movant must show that:  “‘(1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not 
subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrator[ ] refused to heed that legal principle.’”)). 
 208.  Rueter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. 
Ala. 2006). 
 209.  Id. 
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at substantial expense, on top of the already substantial expense of bringing 
the vacatur action in court.”210 
This author is aware of the arguments that the finality of an arbitration 
award benefits the investor, focusing on the costs to an investor if the firm 
appeals the trial court’s decision, and the speed of arbitration panels versus 
the court system.211  Based upon the current legal structure governing 
arbitrations, however, an arbitration proceeding may ultimately end up 
costing the investor more than they would have paid at the court.  This is 
because, as noted above, the investor must go to court to enforce a positive 
arbitration award or litigate an adverse arbitration award.212  Investors may 
also be sanctioned for appealing their awards.213 The lack of appellate 
rights for either party in an arbitration is an absolute based upon rules and 
decisions that have been mandated by lower courts and confirmed by the 
Supreme Court.214  So the real issue is whether the investor has a generally 
faster and cheaper dispute resolution or whether the investor has the ability 
to appeal an adverse arbitration award. 
This argument is irrelevant, however, to the issue of mandatory 
PDAAS.  It is important to note that while an arbitration may be less costly 
and more efficient, the aggrieved party will definitely not receive effective 
judicial review.  In Oxford Health Plans, LLC, the Supreme Court stated 
that “the potential for . . . mistakes is the price of agreeing to 
arbitration.”215  However, this is the exact choice that mandatory PDAAs 
take away from investors. 
3. Unconscionability Analysis 
This Article contends that mandatory PDAAs are per se 
unconscionable because they require investors to involuntarily waive 
certain constitutional rights and provide narrow appellate avenues that 
effectively preclude judicial review of arbitral awards.  An agreement to 
arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as a matter of federal law 
“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
 
 210.  Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. 
L. REV. 151, 194 (2004). 
    211.   See e.g., The Securities Arbitration System:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 
15-17 (2005) (statement of Marc E. Lackritz, President, Sec. Indus. Ass’n).  
    212.   Rutledge, supra note 210, at 194. 
   213.  See Reuter, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1256.   
    214.   See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (courts’ “power to vacate an 
award is limited”).   
 215.  Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2070 (2013) (emphasis 
added). 
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any contract.”216  It is informative to look at how courts have interpreted the 
unconscionability doctrine and how it applies to the arguments made 
herein. 
The Supreme Court in Concepcion held that “[a] finding of 
unconscionability requires ‘a “procedural” and a “substantive” element, the 
former focusing on “oppression” or “surprise” due to unequal bargaining 
power, the latter on “overly harsh” or “one-sided” results.’”217  Most courts 
have focused on the unconscionability of the terms of the arbitration 
agreement rather than, as this Article contends, the legal regime governing 
arbitration.  This Article contends that mandatory PDAAs in the securities 
industry are per se unconscionable based upon the involuntary waiver of 
certain constitutional rights, lack of due process of law, and lack of judicial 
review.218 
Mandatory PDAAs meet the first prong of the unconscionability test 
(procedural), because an investor would be surprised to learn that by 
agreeing to work with a financial advisor, he or she is required to relinquish 
his or her constitutional rights to access the courts and to due process of 
law.219  As noted above in the Schwab brokerage agreement, the actual 
contract makes no mention of the mandatory nature of the arbitration; it is 
only when the investor reads the arbitration clause buried in the disclosure 
document that the investor realizes that he or she is subject to mandatory 
arbitration.220  Investors would also be surprised to learn that arbitrators do 
not have to follow the law in the arbitration proceeding, provide a reasoned 
decision, or gather all relevant evidence.221  Investors are subject to 
oppression, because they generally do not realize they have involuntarily 
relinquished these rights until a dispute arises, which could be months or 
years after signing the initial contract.222 
Mandatory PDAAs also meet the second prong of the 
unconscionability test (substantive), because under the current legal 
regime, these agreements provide narrow appellate avenues that effectively 
preclude judicial review.  As discussed above, the opportunity for judicial 
 
 216.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 217.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (quoting 
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)). 
   218.    See supra Section II.C.1.  
   219.    Id. 
   220.    See Schwab, supra note 152 (exemplifying mandatory PDAA common in 
brokerage contracts). 
   221.    See supra Section II.C.2. 
  222.   See Jeff Sovern, et al., 'Whimsy Little Contracts' with Unexpected Consequences: 
An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements (St. John's 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-0009, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2516432.  
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review of an arbitration award’s substance is virtually non-existent.223  This 
Article contends that the legal regime governing the appeal of arbitration 
awards leads to extremely “one-sided” results; however, it is one-sided 
with regard to the prevailing party in the arbitration rather than the drafter 
of the agreement.  For example, regardless of whether the investor or 
financial service provider prevail in the arbitration, the losing party 
effectively has no recourse to judicial review.224 
In Highway Equipment Co. v. Caterpillar, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held 
that “[t]o be unconscionable, a contract must be one ‘which no man in his 
senses, not under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair 
and honest man could accept, on the other.’”225  Based upon the Section 
below that discusses how a mandatory PDAA would read under the current 
legal regime,226 no investor or financial service provider would be likely to 
sign such an agreement. 
This Article also contends that this analysis does not run afoul of the 
holding in Concepcion that found that generally applicable contract 
defenses, such as duress or unconscionability, were alleged to have been 
applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.227  As noted above, 
arbitration is appropriate for a number of investors; however, investors 
should be able to make the choice based upon their own circumstances. 
The unconscionability doctrine, as applied in this Article, only 
disfavors mandatory arbitration; it has no effect on voluntary arbitration.  
This is a distinction that has been repeatedly stated throughout this Article 
and has been explicitly affirmed by the courts––arbitration is a matter of 
consent.228  Once an investor is informed of his or her rights under an 
arbitration agreement and chooses to arbitrate his or her claim, the investor 
is subject to those terms.  However, because of the constitutional rights 
involved and the lack of access to judicial review, the Supreme Court 
should clearly separate mandatory and voluntary arbitration.  The court 
should use the substance of this Article to illustrate that while voluntary 
arbitration can be a less costly and efficient method for dispute resolution, 
forcing investors into that system will never be acceptable. 
 
   223.     See supra Section II.C.2. 
   224.     See supra Section II.C.2.e.  
   225.     Highway Equip. Co. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 908 F.2d 60, 65 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting 
Hume v. United States, 131 U.S. 406, 410 (1889)). 
   226.     See infra Section III.A. 
   227.     AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).  
   228.     Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).  
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III. INFORMING THE INVESTOR 
A. How a Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreement Would Read 
Under the Current Legal Framework 
This section of the Article provides an example of what an investor’s 
mandatory PDAA would look like if it clearly explained not only the 
arbitration process, but also the legal framework governing that process: 
 
Mandatory Arbitration Provision 
I agree that by working with you, I am being forced to submit all 
controversies that may arise between us to binding arbitration controlled by 
FINRA, the organization to which you are a member.  Because such 
agreements are so pervasive throughout the securities industry, I have little 
choice but to accept this agreement if I wish to have assistance in reaching 
my financial goals.  Such controversies include, but are not limited to, 
those involving any transaction in any of my accounts with you, or the 
construction, performance or breach of any agreement between us, whether 
entered into or occurring prior, on or subsequent to the date hereof. 
I acknowledge that the arbitration process is generally more efficient 
and streamlined than litigation; however, by agreeing to work with you, I 
am waiving certain constitutional rights, including my right to seek 
remedies in court and my right to due process of law.  I acknowledge that 
pre-arbitration discovery is more limited than the discovery allowed during 
a court proceeding and that I am not guaranteed a hearing to articulate my 
claims.229 
If I disagree with the arbitrators’ award, I acknowledge that there are 
few options for appealing the award.230  Even though awards must be in 
writing, arbitrators are not required to write reasoned opinions, provide 
explanations, or justify their decisions231 and any ambiguity in the award 
 
 229.  Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty:  The Regulation of Fairness in Securities 
Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 101, 108 (2008). 
 230.  See ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462–63 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(explaining because of the courts’ limited ability to review arbitration awards, their powers 
of review have been described as “among the narrowest known to the law.”); see Hall St. 
Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (establishing that contracting parties may not 
opt out of FAA’s default standards for vacatur and fashion their own). 
 231.  FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 12904 (2014); see Atkinson v. 
Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962) (holding the employer was not required to 
arbitrate its claim due to the contract); see also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 
(clarifying an arbitrators’ “award may be made without explanation of their reasons and 
without a complete record of their proceedings . . .”). 
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must be resolved, if possible, in a manner supporting confirmation of the 
award.232 
Even if I can show that the arbitrators did not follow the arbitration 
(FINRA) rules, the Court will not overturn the award.233  Even if I can 
show that the arbitrators applied the incorrect law to my case, the Court 
will not overturn the award.234  Even if during the arbitration proceedings I 
overhear one of the arbitrators discussing his or her negative view of my 
case, the Court will not overturn the award.235  Even if the arbitrator fails to 
disclose possible conflicts of interest and is later revealed to have had 
previous business contacts with the opposing party, the Court will not 
overturn the award.236  Even if the arbitrators do not procure relevant 
documents that could have proven my case, the Court will not overturn the 
award.237  Even if I can show that the arbitrators’ decision was not 
 
 232.  See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) 
(determining “as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract 
and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious 
error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”); see Atl. Aviation, Inc. v. EBM Grp., Inc., 
11 F.3d 1276, 1282 (5th Cir. 1994) (indicating “courts should defer to the arbitrator’s 
resolution of the dispute whenever possible”). 
 233.  See Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 820 (8th Cir. 
2001) (explaining “only the statutory grounds in § 10(a) of the Act justify vacating an 
award; arbitration rules and ethical codes ‘do not have force of law.’”) (quoting Merit Ins. 
Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 234.  See, e.g., Local 771, I.A.T.S.E. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 546 F.2d 1107, 1113 (2d Cir. 
1977) (clarifying an arbitration award “will not be set aside for mistaken application of the 
law”); Flexible Mfg. Sys. PTY v. Super Prods. Corp. 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(highlighting that if “an arbitrator makes a mistake, by erroneously rejecting a valid, or even 
a dispositive legal defense, [it] does not provide grounds for vacating an award”); see also 
Commercial Refrigeration, Inc. v. Layton Constr. Co., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (D. Utah 2004) 
(explaining whether the arbitrator resolved legal issue correctly is not matter for court to 
determine); Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 607 F.3d 634, 641 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (clarifying that a “manifest disregard of the law” means something more than just 
an error in law or a failure on the part of an arbitrator to understand or apply law). 
 235.  “Evidence of corruption must be abundantly clear in order to vacate” an arbitration 
award, and overheard conversation in which an arbitrator allegedly said that one party 
would receive a favorable decision was “not ‘direct’ or ‘definite’ evidence of bias.”  Kolel 
Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Trust, 729 F.3d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
 236.  See Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d 
1309, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining an arbitrator cannot be guilty of “evident 
partiality” by reason of “past business contacts between his employer” and interested party, 
“absent actual knowledge of a real or potential conflict”); Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. 
Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 623 (7th Cir. 2002) (establishing an arbitrator’s “failure to make 
a full disclosure may sully his reputation for candor but does not demonstrate ‘evident 
partiality’ and thus does not spoil the award.”). 
 237.  See, e.g., Nat’l Cas. Co. v First State Ins. Group, 430 F.3d 492, 498 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that where plaintiff sought to vacate arbitration award on grounds that the 
arbitration panel issued an award without forcing defendant company to produce relevant 
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supported by any evidence238 or that the decision was arbitrary,239 the Court 
will not overturn the award.  I further acknowledge that even if I can show 
that the arbitrators made contradictory findings of fact, the Court will not 
overturn the award240 and that the only way to overturn an award on the 
ground of “manifest disregard of the law” is to show that the arbitrators 
recognized the applicable law and then chose to ignore it; however, since 
the arbitrators are not required to provide any explanation or reasons for 
their decision, I recognize that this is a near-impossible hurdle.241 
I acknowledge that I may be subject to sanctions for trying to vacate 
the arbitration award.242  I further acknowledge that in the event I am 
successful in vacating an adverse arbitration award, I have to return to 
arbitration to re-litigate the matter at substantial expense, on top of the 
already substantial expense of bringing the vacatur action in court.243 
In the event that I am granted an award by the arbitration panel, I 
acknowledge that even though FINRA rules state that “[a]ll monetary 
awards shall be paid within 30 days of receipt unless a motion to vacate has 
been filed with a court of competent jurisdiction,” FINRA has no power to 
enforce the award,244 other than to suspend or cancel the registration of the 
 
documents, there was no misconduct because panel acted within its authority when it chose 
to render decision after drawing inferences against company as to what documents would 
show); Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 77 
(2d Cir. 2012) (holding “[t]he FAA does not bestow on a party the right to receive 
information about every matter that it might consider important or useful in presenting its 
case.”). 
 238.  See Coutee v. Barington Capital Grp., L.P., 336 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(affirming the courts “have no authority to re-weigh the evidence” presented to the 
arbitration panel). 
 239.  See Spungin v. GenSpring Family Offices, LLC, 883 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 (S.D. 
Fla. 2012) (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (highlighting  
“it is apparent that an arbitration award cannot be vacated for being arbitrary and 
capricious.”); see also Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 376 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 
2004) (establishing that “arbitrariness and capriciousness is not an accepted nonstatutory 
ground for vacatur” under the Federal Arbitration Act.). 
 240.  See Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining “[w]hether 
or not the panel’s findings are supported by the evidence in the record is beyond the scope 
of our review.”). 
 241.  Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir.1995)) (clarifying 
“[a]rbitrators are not required to explain their decisions.  If they choose not to do so, it is all 
but impossible to determine whether they acted with manifest disregard for the law.”). 
 242.  Rueter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1265 
(N.D. Ala. 2006). 
 243.  See supra note 210 and accompanying text (emphasizing the return to arbitration if 
original award is overturned). 
 244.  FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 12904 (2014); see Fiero v. Fin. Indus. 
Regulatory Auth., Inc., 660 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing the “seemingly 
inexplicable nature of a gap in the FINRA enforcement scheme:  fines may be levied but not 
NELSON_FINAL (ARTICLE 5) .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2015  5:43 PM 
2015] TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT 615 
 
broker or brokerage firm.245  I acknowledge that I must submit a petition to 
confirm the arbitration award with the courts. 
 
This arbitration agreement provides the investor with a clear 
articulation of the arbitration process and the laws governing that process.  
This author contends that if an investor reads the language of the 
agreement, he or she would try to amend the language to exclude the 
arbitration provisions or just avoid working with the advisor altogether.  
With the pervasive use of mandatory PDAAs in the securities industry, 
however, investors may find this to be an insurmountable obstacle. 
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
This section of the Article offers possible solutions for protecting 
investors from being forced into a dispute resolution system that they never 
agreed to.  The solutions include ending mandatory arbitration in brokerage 
and advisory contracts, or providing investors with a separate disclosure 
document to allow the advisor to receive an investor’s informed consent 
and allowing the investor to opt-out of arbitration.  This author was 
heartened by the recent news that FINRA has established an arbitration task 
force to “consider possible enhancements to its arbitration forum to 
improve the transparency, impartiality and efficiency of FINRA’s securities 
arbitration forum for all participants.”246 
A. Ending Mandatory Arbitration 
The most appropriate solution to this problem is to end the practice of 
placing mandatory PDAAs in brokerage and advisory contracts.  As stated 
throughout this Article, arbitration in the securities industry is not 
necessarily bad, and many investors would benefit from arbitration; 
however, investors should be given this choice. 
The issue of mandatory PDAAs, in a variety of industries, has been a 
contested issue in Congress since the mid 1990’s.  Since 1995, there have 
been 139 anti-arbitration bills introduced in Congress; however, none of 
these were passed into law.247  These include bills regarding brokerage 
 
collected.”). 
 245.  FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 9554 (2014).  
 246.  Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Announces Arbitration Task 
Force (July 17, 2014), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2014/ 
P554192.  
 247.  Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1309, 
1310.   
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contracts, investor contracts, lending contracts, employment contracts, and 
many more.248 
Some members of Congress have decided that they need to take action 
against these clauses in the securities industry, which they argue are unfair 
to investors who must forfeit their right to “their day in court” in order to 
obtain the professional services of a broker or investment adviser.  In an 
interview with InvestmentNews, Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN), a member of 
the House Financial Services Committee, stated that “[i]nvestors shouldn’t 
have to sign away their rights in order to work with a financial adviser or 
broker dealer to build a secure retirement.  By removing some of the unfair 
advantages, consumers will be more eager to invest, which will create jobs 
and strengthen the economy.”249 
Rep. Ellison introduced the Investor Choice Act of 2013 to address 
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration in brokerage and advisory agreements.250  
The purpose of the bill is to “amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to 
prohibit mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements, and for other 
purposes.”251  In summary, the bill would make it unlawful for brokers, 
advisers, and certain other financial services professionals to mandate pre-
dispute arbitration of claims and to prevent investors from seeking redress 
through class action lawsuits.252 
It is important to note that even though Congress is looking at the 
issue of mandatory PDAAS in the securities industry, the SEC already has 
the authority to mandate that individuals and companies no longer use these 
clauses in their contracts.  Section 921 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) authorized the 
SEC to adopt regulations to ban, condition, or limit mandatory arbitration 
clauses.253  This also allows FINRA to amend its rules concerning 
mandatory arbitration, because the SEC must approve any FINRA 
proposed rule.  As of the date of this Article, no action has been taken. 
This inaction on the part of the SEC is surprising, especially since 
over thirty years ago, in 1979, the SEC “expressed concern about the use of 
arbitration clauses in broker-dealer customer agreements which purport to 
 
 248.  See id. (including appendix listing all 139 bills and a summary of the bills and their 
status). 
 249.  Mark Schoeff, House Democrat Introduces Bill to End Mandatory Arbitration, 
INVESTMENTNEWS, (Aug. 5, 2013, 2:59 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/ 
20130805/FREE/130809965?template=printart. 
 250.  Investor Choice Act of 2013, H.R. 2998, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 251.  Id. at 1. 
 252.  Id. at 1–2. 
 253.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010). 
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bind customers to arbitrate all future disputes with a broker-dealer.”254  In 
the Release, the SEC explicitly stated that:  
 
[t]he Commission believes that the use of clauses which purport 
to bind customers to arbitrate all future disputes which may arise 
between them and their broker-dealers, without specifying the 
meaning, effect and enforceability thereof, is inconsistent with 
just and equitable principles of trade, and may raise serious 
questions of compliance with the anti-fraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws.255 
 
The Senate has also recently asked the SEC to investigate the use of 
mandatory PDAAs in their most recent appropriations bill:  “[t]he 
Committee directs that the SEC prioritize, initiate, and complete critical 
rulemakings to address . . . limiting use of mandatory arbitration 
agreements in brokerage customer service agreements . . . .”256  This 
request reflects Congressional interest in understanding the impact of 
PDAAs in the financial services industry.   
B. Informed Consent and Opt-Out Provision 
The second option is to mandate that financial service providers obtain 
investors’ informed consent before signing the advisory or brokerage 
agreement and allowing the investor to “opt-out” of the pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement.  This can be handled by two different methods.  The 
first method is for the financial service provider to furnish the investor with 
an arbitration document, separate from the contract, which describes the 
arbitration process (including options for appeal) at the beginning of the 
client relationship.  The second method is for the financial service provider 
to deliver this document to the investor once a dispute arises and, at that 
time, the investor can make an informed decision whether to enter into 
arbitration.  Both of these methods require an investor to choose a single 
method of dispute resolution.  For example, an investor cannot choose 
litigation, but then ask for arbitration if the investor is losing in court. 
Under this method, investors have the choice of arbitration or 
litigation.  Currently, investors are generally notified by a clause buried in 
the boilerplate language of a brokerage or advisory contract or lengthy 
 
 254.  Notice to Broker-Dealers Concerning Clauses in Customer Agreements which 
Provide for Arbitration of Future Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, 1979 WL 
174165, at *1 (July 2, 1979). 
 255.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 256.  2015 APPROPRIATIONS BILL, supra note 5, at 132. 
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disclosure document.  By requiring informed consent, an investor will be 
provided with all the information he or she needs to make an informed 
decision and will not have to suffer due to a clause, which he or she was 
not aware of, buried in a contract or long disclosure document. 
CONCLUSION 
An overwhelming majority of retail brokerage, and many investment 
advisory agreements, include language requiring that all disputes between 
the customer and the broker-dealer/investment adviser be resolved through 
arbitration, and only in rare instances can an investor open either a 
brokerage or investment advisory account without agreeing to submit to 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. 
This Article has provided ample evidence that mandatory PDAAs 
force investors to relinquish certain constitutional rights.  This Article has 
also provided ample evidence that there is effectively no appellate review 
of arbitration awards and that it is virtually impossible for an investor to 
overturn an erroneous award.  As noted above, some investor claims are 
appropriate for arbitration; however, the choice should belong to the 
investor.  The SEC has the authority to ban these types of agreements; 
however, no action has been taken.  Until these types of agreements are 
banned from the industry, investors will continue to be forced into a dispute 
resolution system that lacks transparency, requires the investor to 
relinquish certain constitutional rights, and lacks any effective mechanism 
to correct erroneous decisions. 
 
